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1.  Introduction 
There are very few laws in economics, but there are a number of evidential statements 
that take on the appearance of laws. One of these is the announced savings in subsidy 
when introducing competitive tendering. Net of administrative costs, these savings are 
frequently quoted to lie between 20% and 30%, net of administration costs. On closer 
inspection the savings are associated, in the main, with services previously provided by 
the public sector under a public monopoly and are typically the outcome of a first-time 
tendering process. Subsequent re-tendering delivers minimal gains in subsidy reduction 
and often leads to an increase (above the consumer price index) in subsidy cost, in part 
response to the initial winner’s curse. In some situations where there are a large number 
of small operators in the informal transport sector, as in Brazil (de Aragao and 
Brasileiro 1999), that are being replaced by a few larger operators (‘relocating’ into the 
formal transport sector), the costs of service delivery under competitive tendering can 
increase1. Indeed in many developing economies, a previously unsubsidized high 
frequency and flexible service becomes subsidised as part of the price of the regulator 
controlling the sector. The tendency for the number of bidders in a re-tender to decrease 
in some countries, especially as the contract size increases2, suggests that the 
sustainability of initial cost savings may become problematic and widespread.  
 
Nevertheless, competitive tendering (CT) remains an attractive reform strategy with a 
growing interest in finding ways of making CT incentive compatible and delivering 
value for money in subsidy outlay by government3. However, despite this commitment, 
as time passes, a number of deficiencies in the existing CT process have emerged, 
raising questions about where this approach is most suitable and ways in which it is 
best applied. Some of these deficiencies are attributable in part to the inadequacy of the 
regulatory framework within which CT is delivered and monitored and in part due to 
the nature of competitive tendering. 
 
Such issues suggest a reconsideration of competitive tendering as the preferred way 
under all circumstances of contracting in the future and a need to consider other 
regimes, especially negotiated performance-based contracts, as a means of deciding 
rights to deliver public transport services, as an alternative (and/or sequenced 
complement)4 to CT.  Negotiated contracts5 are common in public-private partnerships 
in the provision of infrastructure but are less visible in public transport operation. 
Berechman (1994, 298-99) suggests that “If costs of having a private firm supply the 
services could be reduced by means of a negotiated contract, the considerable costs of 
organising a competitive bidding would be averted. Indeed …a competitive tendering 
scheme might in some cases be inferior to methods of contract renewal or negotiation”. 
In this paper we assess the influence of the range of contracts that are competitively 
tendered in the bus sector (primarily the provision of urban services), highlighting not 
                                                 
1 After adjusting for new regulatory requirements, such as minimum vehicle and labour standards and operator accreditation.  
2 The move away from route-based to area-based contracts to promote network interdependency is a contributing influence. In 
the London context where route-based contracts still flourish, the network benefits are preserved through appropriate 
regulatory procedures and contract obligations.  
3 For example, competitive tendering is proposed as an instrument to make radical change in service delivery in Santiago, 
Chile, to replace 4,000 bus operators (with 8,000 buses) with 15 operators.  
4 In South Africa CTs are a way to attract new entrants into the market, then based on performance, an extension is negotiated. 
To attract new entrants, they stipulate a minimum percentage of subcontracting, so that after one year of subcontracting, the 
subcontractor can become a “set aside” and can operate in their own right as a fully fledged operator. 
5 When we refer to negotiated contracts we imply performance-based contracts as defined in Section 2. 
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just the cost savings but other relevant considerations of service provision. Drawing on 
a number of earlier papers by the author and other participants in the international 
conference series on competition and ownership of land passenger transport6, we 
document the subsidy savings from a large number of CT contracts. To assess the 
virtues of such savings, we place the evidence within a broader framework that 
recognizes the importance of delivering value for money in the provision of subsidized 
bus services. Through this broader perspective we start to see the narrowness of the 
strictly cost recovery objective and the warning signals through a failure to provide 
appropriate incentives to operators to grow the patronage market.  
 
2.  Definitional issues 
Competitive tendering is a service delivery strategy and member of the broad class of 
contractual regimes. An effective contractual regime is one within which the 
government, the regulator, the operator, and society at large can participate as trusting 
partners in securing value for money in (i) the allocation of a total subsidy budget to the 
provision of services or (ii) in the delivery of non-subsidised services (Hensher and 
Houghton 2005)7. The government’s role is strategic (S), the regulator’s role is tactical 
(T) and the operator’s role is operational (O)8. Within such a contractual regime an 
operator provides services at best practice cost levels for a given level of service 
delivery, either in return for direct financial support from government, awarded by 
either competitive tendering or negotiation, or in return for permission to operate a 
negotiated/agreed level of service without subsidy but, for example, subject to a cost-
plus fare determination.  
 
Within such a contractual regime, the payment structure may be based on a fixed 
payment and/or a set of incentive payments above the fixed payment linked to 
patronage and/or service levels. An example of a fixed payment system is a community 
service obligation payment linked to a minimum service level program determined by 
negotiation or competitive tendering, and/or a partnered service design and level. The 
incentive payments linked to patronage and/or service growth can reflect benefits 
derived from all sources (i.e. consumer or user surplus) and benefits linked to a specific 
                                                 
6 Known as the Thredbo series, the International Conference Series on Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger 
Transport has been held biannually since the first conference in Thredbo, Australia, 1989. Thredbo 2 through to 8 have been 
held in Tampere, Finland, 1991; Toronto, Canada, 1993; Rotorua, New Zealand, 1995; Leeds UK 1997; Cape Town, South 
Africa, 1999; Molde, Norway, 2001; and Rio de Janerio Brazil in 2003. Further details and paper are provided under the 
Thredbo icon at http://www.itls.usyd.edu.au. 
7 Although performance based contracts (PBCs) in developed economies tend to be integrated into a system of subsidy 
support, this need not be the case in all situations. For example, in Brazil, PBCs are being considered in a context where the 
operators in the formal (ie ‘legal’) sector would be required to comply with benchmark best practice on costs (without any 
subsidy support under community service obligation payments), with fares determined by a cost-plus formula and patronage 
incentive payments available for patronage growth above an agreed baseline. In Santiago (Chile) an innovative internal cross-
subsidy scheme between feeder service operators via a centrally tendered fare collector (using smart cards) is designed to use 
(feeder) system wide fare revenue to eliminate all public subsidy. 
8 The STO framework recognizes that policy, planning and operations exist within a hierarchy of objectives functionally split into 
three interdependent layers. The main features of the framework are represented by three STO levels (Macario 2001):  
• The Strategic level where the focus is on the establishment of broad goals and objectives and guidance on ways of 
achieving outcomes consistent with such goals (‘what do you want to achieve’) 
• The Tactical level which highlights the supporting mechanisms (eg the regulatory process) to achieve the strategic 
goals. There is a strong emphasis on fare and service planning. In many countries there is no explicit public transport 
regulator and so tactical functions are the responsibility of authorities and/or operators. 
• The Operational level which focuses on delivering the desired services to the market consistent with the strategic intent 
and aided by tactical mechanisms.  
Van de Velde and Pruijmboom (2003) illustrate how giving tenderers tactical responsibilities will lead to service uplifts. 
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objective such as reducing negative environmental impacts. Those linked to service 
levels may also incorporate a mechanism for supporting new entrants into developing 
markets. Patronage incentive payments may be based on various criteria such as 
passenger boardings and passenger kilometers, the latter to account for the trip length 
distribution. 
 
It is useful to distinguish between the basis for procuring the operator and the basis for 
paying/rewarding the selected operator (Wallis 2005). A number of combinations of 
procurement and payment strategies can be devised from this simple dichotomy, as 
summarised in Figure 1 (from Hensher and Houghton 2005a). Most commonly, the 
payment model would be defined in advance by government; and then the operator 
selected through competitive tendering or a negotiation process.  However, 
competitively tendered and negotiated contracts can be complementary in a temporal 
sequence. For example, one can use a service incentive payment under a negotiated 
contract to assist new entrants into new markets (including a base community service 
obligation payment) perhaps with training/skill enhancement support9. When a market 
is established (given sufficient elapsed time – e.g. 5-10 years) one might introduce a 
performance-based contract (PBC) via competitive tendering to rationalise the number 
of ‘competing’ operators in a corridor (as is proposed for Santiago, Chile) or select an 
individual operator at a route or corridor or area level; or, one might move to a PBC 
regime via a negotiated contract system.  Alternatively, a government might use 
competitive tendering to short-list a number of suppliers with whom it then negotiates 
to select the preferred supplier. 
 
Incentive payments can be introduced through competitive tendering or negotiation 
under a PBC regime. For example, one can establish a patronage incentive payment of 
various possible types: (i) the Adelaide Model (see Wallis 2003, 2005) provides an 
agreed non–competitive sum per additional passenger; (ii) the Hensher-Houghton 
Model (2004, 2005) provides a fixed or variable patronage incentive payment budget 
competed for amongst a predefined set of operating areas, referred to as competition at 
the later service delivery stage, as distinct from at the tendering stage.  
 
Given that many factors affecting patronage are outside the influence of the operator, 
the appropriate level of patronage incentive payment may be fairly modest; and this 
will then need to be supplemented by a service incentive payment to provide the 
operator with sufficient incentive to expand services. The Adelaide model adopts this 
approach, and requires a tactical-level sign-off on service proposals.  This service 
incentive payment may be a marginal payment rate (as in Adelaide) or an amount 
competed for by operators who grow service from an agreed minimum service level 
(MSL) linked to a base payment. The introduction of a service incentive payment, 
where one does not compete for subsidy budget between operators in different spatial 
settings, is an appealing model for developing economies such as South Africa and 
Brazil (the current Brazilian model is shown on right hand side of Figure 1 by the 
thicker line only). 
                                                 
9 The issue of skill enhancement in preparation for participating competitive tendered or negotiated contracts is a real concern 
in many developing economies (examples being South Africa, Chile and Brazil). 
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Figure 1.  Processes for Procurement and Payment Rates Determination 
(Hensher and Houghton 2005a)10 
 
Note: (i) A Greenfield site is different to ‘creating a market’. The latter is more global 
in its national context and refers to a general absence of expertise that can readily 
participate in the market, be it an area already serviced or a new development with no 
services (i.e. a Greenfield site). (ii) The block under Greenfield, could also be 
negotiated. For example, in South Africa (e.g. Durban) an expression of interest for 
new services is common which is not subject to CT. 
 
We are now well placed to assess the influence of competitive tendering on cost 
savings as well as to highlight the range of other demand and supply side impacts. In 
the next section we draw on real world evidence from a range of locations throughout 
the world. We have selected the specific ‘case studies’ as examples of the diversity of 
implementation of competition tendering and other contracting regimes (such as quality 
contracts that are a mixture of negotiation and tendering).  
 
                                                 
10 We also have another possible process - competition at the service delivery stage, applied to determine patronage incentive 
payment rates when the budget is fixed, as promoted in Hensher and Houghton (2005). Competition for patronage incentive 
payments therefore, can be an optional complement to both competitively tendered and negotiated contracts. The distinction 
between competitively tendered and negotiated contracts is blurred to the extent that negotiated contracts may be used to 
determine patronage incentive payments in a contract where a community service obligation is determined through competitive 
tendering, to form a mixed contract. Furthermore, competition at the service delivery stage may be used to determine 
patronage incentive payments when a community service obligation is determined by either a competitively tendered or a 
negotiated contract.  
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3.  Evidence on cost savings 
3.1  Overview of the evidence 
Table 1 summarises the evidence from studies in 10 developed countries, covering 
more than 20 cities, on the cost impacts associated with the competitive tendering of 
urban bus services.  This evidence relates to the period since 1985.  The emphasis is on 
changes in unit (gross) costs of service provision, rather than on total costs (which may 
be affected by changes in the amount of service provided) or on net subsidy levels 
(generally reductions in net subsidy levels would be proportionately greater than any 
reductions in unit costs).  Unit costs are typically measured per bus kilometre or per bus 
hour. 
 
The main focus of Table 1 is on the unit cost impacts associated with the initial 
competitive tendering of services previously provided through a monopoly supplier 
arrangement, in most cases with a publicly-owned operator.  However, more evidence 
is now becoming available on the experience with second and subsequent rounds of 
competitive tendering for the same services.  Some of this evidence is included in Table 
1, but it is set out in more detail in Table 2, for the five countries for which good 
evidence has been identified. 
 
It is recognised that major difficulties arise in deriving a consistent set of data on cost 
impacts, in comparing results from the different countries and cities; and in drawing 
wider conclusions from the evidence: 
 
 Cities start from different points in terms of pre-CT contracting models, operator 
ownership, funding arrangements etc. 
 
 Frequently, CT is accompanied by changes in service levels, service quality 
standards, asset specification etc – which would tend to affect unit costs of 
supply. 
 
 The introduction of CT to a previously-monopoly situation is typically 
accompanied by institutional restructuring, with the separation of policy, funding 
and contracting functions from operating functions.  The assessment of cost 
impacts attempts (where possible) to compare like-for-like functions before and 
after the introduction of CT.  However, even assuming this is achieved, it should 
be recognised that these before/after comparisons generally relate to a package of 
regulatory and institutional policy reforms, rather than just the (ceteris paribus) 
introduction of a competitive procurement process to replace a monopoly 
situation. 
 
 Typically there are significant one-off costs associated with the establishment of 
the CT system, and these may include transition (eg. redundancy, retraining) costs 
for the previous operator, particularly where this is a publicly-owned operator.  
These costs are often not included in publicly-available information. 
 
Additional to these factors, if the impacts of CT policies are to be adequately assessed, 
the counter-factual case needs to be estimated (ie. what cost trends would have 
occurred in the absence of the CT policy).  This is at best a difficult and somewhat 
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conjectural task, and was generally beyond the scope of our appraisal, which focussed 
on the unit costs shortly before and shortly after the CT process. Having noted these 
various caveats, the following sections comment on the main groups of evidence that 
are summarised in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
3.2  Great Britain 
In Great Britain (outside London), the ‘deregulation’ of local bus services was 
introduced in 1986.  Socially-desirable but non-commercial services were then 
procured by local authorities to ‘fill the gaps’, through a CT process: these tendered 
services comprise 15%-20% of all services.  In London, a fully-tendered regime was 
introduced from 1985, with all services being progressively opened to CT over a 15-
year phase-in period (completed in 2000).  Prior to 1985/86, local bus service provision 
in Great Britain was dominated by publicly-owned companies; but since the reforms 
the great majority of services in both London and elsewhere have been provided by 
private sector operators. 
 
Sine 1985/86, unit costs (per bus kilometre) both in London and the rest of Great 
Britain have fallen by about the same amount, slightly over 50% in real terms (up to 
year 2000).  The unit cost reduction in London was, in the early years, somewhat 
slower than that elsewhere, reflecting that the reforms were implemented more 
gradually in London (although there was an element of the ‘ripple’ effect, with 
reductions in unit costs for the remaining monopoly services as well as the tendered 
services). 
 
A number of studies have assessed the factors contributing to these cost reductions in 
more detail.  Preston and Holland 2001 notes that the unit cost reductions have come 
fairly evenly from three main sources: reduced factor prices (particularly labour, but 
also fuel); reduced use of factors (again particularly labour, but also land); and 
improved production processes (partly associated with the deployment of more 
appropriately-sized vehicles). 
 
Since the late 1990s, there is clear evidence (Table 2) that CT prices have been 
increasing faster than general inflation and, it appears, faster than the inflation of any 
composite cost index relevant to the urban bus sector.  In London, contract prices in the 
5 years up to 2000/01 increased at a rate of around 10% pa on average (money terms); 
while in the rest of Great Britain the rate of increase was somewhat higher: over this 
period the general rate of inflation was well under 5% pa.  
 
Table 2 indicates some of the main factors contributing to the escalation of contract 
prices in London: many of these factors are associated with higher standards (eg. low 
floor buses) and input price increases reflecting a buoyant economy and a tight labour 
market.  The evidence indicates that operators have not in general been earning 
‘excessive’ profits, although profit margins have tended to increase from the low levels 
experienced in the late 1980s/early 1990s. 
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TABLE 1:  SUMMARY OF COST IMPACTS FROM COMPETITIVE TENDERING 
Country City Prior Operations 
Initial 
CT 
Timing 
Proportion of 
Services Subject 
to CT 
Key Tender & 
Contract Features 
Unit Cost 
Impacts of CT Other Impacts Reference/Notes 
London Govt monopoly 
operator 
1985-
2000 
Progressively to 
100% 
Route contracts, 
gross cost, mostly 5 
years 
51% reduction 
(1985-2000). 
Increase in bus kms (32%), 
patronage (12%) and farebox 
cost recovery (60% to 95%), 
1985-2000. 
Cox and Duthion 2001. Great Britain 
Rest of GB Various – most by 
public (municipal 
or national) 
operators. 
1986 c. 20% (‘gap-
filling’ services). 
Route contracts 
(‘gap-filling’), 
mostly small, most 
net cost basis, up to 5 
years. 
54% reduction 
(1986-99). 
 Cox and Duthion 2001, Atkins 
2005, van de Velde 2003. 
Only c. 20% of services subject to 
CT (remainder deregulated) – but 
cost figures relate to total market.  
Unit cost reductions slightly 
greater than for London over same 
period. 
National/ Major 
Cities 
Mostly private  1994 
onwards 
3% up to 1999, 
now c. 15%. 
Route contracts, 
gross cost 
Not known (CT 
services not 
separated from 
others) 
Overall unit cost reductions in 
sector estimated in range 6% to 
20% (1986-96), little change 
since. 
Johansen 1999, Fearnley and 
Carlquist 1999, van de Velde 
2003. 
Up to 1999, only c. 3% of national 
services were subject to CT; 
proportion has now increased to c. 
15%. 
Norway 
Lillehammer Private operators  1995 100% Route, gross cost + 
incentive, 6 years. 
Initial 21% 
reduction.  
Subsequent increase 
of 33% in second 
tender round. 
Initial increase in patronage 
(33%) and revenue (17%). 
Soberg 2001. 
All (national) Primarily public 
operators 
1989 
onwards 
Progressively to 
95% (year 2000) 
Mostly route, gross 
cost. 
Average reductions 
due to CT, 1987-93, 
originally estimated 
at 12%-14%; more 
recent re-estimates 
5%-6%.  Little 
further change 
1993-2001. 
Services have increased, 
quality improved and vehicle 
age reduced in most cases. 
Alexandersson and Pyddoke 2003, 
Carlquist and Johansen 1999. 
Some doubts on level of cost 
reductions attributable to CT. 
Stockholm Public operator 
dominant. 
1989 on 
wards 
 Area/route, gross 
cost, 5 years. 
Reduction 20% to 
32% in first 3 years 
of CT. 
Vehicle age/quality generally 
enhanced and operational 
performance improved. 
Cox and Duthion 2001, Halcrow 
Fox 2000, Dept of Public 
Enterprise Ireland 2000. 
Sweden 
Helsingborg Public operator  1992 100% (initially) Area (city-wide), 
gross cost, 5 years. 
27% reduction.  Carlquist and Johansen 1999. 
Subsequent conversion to net cost, 
with operator responsible for 
service development etc. 
 
Finland Helsinki c. 50% public 
(municipal/nationa
1995 
onwards 
Progressively up to 
90% + by 2000. 
Route, gross cost + 
quality incentive, 5 
Initial reductions 
17% to 34%: 1999 
Increased service levels, 
reduced fares, upgraded fleet 
YTV Transport Department 2001. 
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TABLE 1:  SUMMARY OF COST IMPACTS FROM COMPETITIVE TENDERING 
Country City Prior Operations 
Initial 
CT 
Timing 
Proportion of 
Services Subject 
to CT 
Key Tender & 
Contract Features 
Unit Cost 
Impacts of CT Other Impacts Reference/Notes 
l) years. costs estimated at 
31% lower than if at 
pre-CT rates.  
Subsequent rounds 
increases 10% to 
18%. 
and reduced subsidies. 
Denmark Copenhagen Primarily 
municipal operator 
1990-
2002 
Progressively to 
100% 
Route, gross cost + 
quality incentives, 4-
8 years. 
24% reduction up to 
1997; but 
subsequently c. 
14% increase 
(1997-2003). 
Large proportion of cost 
savings used to increased 
service levels. 
Cox and Duthion 2001, Halcrow 
Fox 2000, HUR 2003, van de 
Velde 2003. 
Amersfoort Private 2002 100% Area, net cost, 6 
years 
Reduction 37%  60% increase in bus hours for 
previous budget. 
S Holland 
DAV 
Private 2003 100% Area, net cost, 4 
years 
Reduction 15%  11% increase in bus hours for 
6% budget reduction. 
Netherlands 
Utrecht NW Private 2002 100% Area, net cost 4+2 
years 
Reduction 15%  18% increase in bus hours for 
previous budget 
van de Velde and Pruijmboom 
2005 
Italy Rome – (new services) 2001  100% of these 
services. 
Tender: trade-off 
quality features v 
price. 
Reductions 8%, 8% 
and 25% relative to 
in-house operation. 
 Marcucci and Avarello 2005, 
Mingardi 2005 
Validity of cost impacts estimates 
uncertain. 
USA 8 cities     Reductions in range 
30% to 46%, 
relative to non-CT 
operations in area. 
 Cox 2003. 
Adelaide Public (state govt) 
operator. 
1996-
2000 
100% over 4 year 
period. 
Area (large), gross + 
patronage incentive, 
5+5 years. 
Reduction 38% 
(1994-2001). 
Service levels and patronage 
increases since full CT 
implementation. 
Wallis 2003. 
Cost impacts allow for 
administration  costs. 
Australia 
Perth Public (state govt) 
operator. 
1995-
1998 
100% over 3 year 
period. 
Area (large), gross + 
patronage incentive, 
7+ 6 or 7 years. 
Reduction 22% 
(1996-2001). 
Service level and patronage 
increases. 
Wallis 2003 
New Zealand Main cities 
(Auckland, 
Wellington, 
Christchurch) 
Mostly public. 1991 All services not 
‘deregulated’ (ie. c. 
50% WGN, over 
90% AKL & 
CHC). 
Route (small, net, 
mostly 3 to 5 years. 
Public operators: c. 
40% reduction. 
Private operators c. 
5-10% reduction. 
Little change in short term 
(some loss in patronage 
because of uncertainties). 
Travers Morgan 1994 
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TABLE 2:  SUMMARY OF COST IMPACTS SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL TENDER ROUND 
Country City References Services Assessed Unit Cost Impacts Notes, Comments 
London Steer Davies Gleave 
2001 
London bus contracts 
tendered in 1995/96 and 
retendered in 2000/01 
Average gross cost/bus km 
increased by 58% to 63% in 
real terms (ie. c 10% pa 
average) 
Increase comprised following main components: 
 Operating staff labour 35% - 55%: tighter labour 
market; increased proportion of evening and 
weekend work; and increased shift cover to 
improve service reliability. 
 Fuel 45% - 80%: higher fuel prices; and higher 
consumption rates, relating to higher 
environmental standards. 
 New vehicles c. 45%: accelerated fleet 
replacement, particularly to introduce low-floor 
vehicles; and increased use of vehicle leasing, to 
provide greater flexibility at end of contract. 
 Engineering & maintenance 60% - 95%: higher pay 
rates for skilled staff; and increased accident and 
insurance costs.  
 Provision for contract penalties: said to have 
increased three-fold, particularly due to staff 
shortages. 
ATCO 2002 Sample of public bus 
contracts (outside London) 
Average year-on-year price 
increases for like-for-like 
contract renewal (money 
terms): 
1998 11.8% 
1999 17.0% 
2000 16.7% 
2001 20.9% 
2002 19.6% 
Underlying inflation in transport price index was 
2.2% to 2002 (3.9% to 2001). 
Average tenders/contract was 3.0 in 2002 (2.9 in 
2000). 
DETR 1999 Selected case studies of 
tender prices (Cheshire, Kent, 
Staffordshire, Suffolk, Tyne 
& Wear) 
 Reasons for cost increases included: rising staff pay 
rates, higher vehicle costs, falling revenues, increased 
rates of return. 
No apparent correlation between unit costs and 
number of bids. 
Great 
Britain 
Rest of GB 
Atkins 2005 Trends in tender prices in 
England (outside London) 
“Local authorities have been 
facing annual cost increases 
of between 10% and 20% 
simply to secure the same 
level of supported service”.  
 
More detailed report awaited. 
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TABLE 2:  SUMMARY OF COST IMPACTS SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL TENDER ROUND 
Country City References Services Assessed Unit Cost Impacts Notes, Comments 
Norway Lillehammer Soberg O 2001  All Lillehammer bus services, 
originally tendered 1995, 
retendered 2001. 
Changes in gross costs/bus 
km (money terms) since 1996: 
1996–00  +45% 
2000–01  (retendered):+ 33% 
Not clear how these increases relate to trends in RPI, 
transport price index or costs of other bus services. 
Sweden National Alexandersson & 
Pyddoke  2003 
Sample of all local bus 
services in Sweden (by 2000, 
95% had been subject to CT, 
at least once). 
Change in gross costs/bus km 
(real terms) 1993-2001 close 
to zero (after 5% reduction in 
period 1987-93). 
 
Some doubts about veracity of these results. 
Finland Helsinki YTV Transport 
Department 2001 
Unit cost rates for all bus CT 
in the Helsinki region, 
comparing Round 2 and 3 
routes with Round 1 for each 
group of contracts. 
Change in real gross costs: 
YTV: Round 2 (1997-98) + 
1% to 3%; Round 3 (2000-01) 
+ 9% to +15% 
Espoo: Round 2 (2001): + 7% 
Round 1 savings over pre-CT situation were YTV 
26% to 34%, Espoo 32%, so unit costs are still well 
below pre-CT figures. 
Denmark Copenhagen HUR 2003 All Copenhagen bus services, 
covering cost rates from 13 
tendering rounds, 1990-2003. 
Change in real gross costs/bus 
hour by tender round: 
1990 – 1997/98 (low point) – 
24% 
1997/98 – 2003: + 14% 
Overall 1990- 2003: - 13% 
Suggested that part of the cost increases reflects 
higher quality etc standards (greater passenger 
comfort, easier access vehicles). 
Some apparent reduction in competition due to 
mergers/acquisitions. 
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3.3  Scandinavia 
The Scandinavian countries have invested heavily in economic reform of their bus 
sector over the last 15 years (Alexandersson and Pyddoke 2003, Berge et. al. 2005, 
Jarvilouna 2003, Johansen 1999, Norheim 1999). 
 
In Norway, CT is permitted under legislation passed in 1994, but the majority of 
services are still procured through negotiated (generally net cost) contracts.  Over the 
period 1986-96, unit costs for the industry as a whole were estimated as reducing in the 
range 6% to 20%, while cost recovery increased from 63% to 76%.   It is hypothesised 
that these cost reductions were the outcome of several factors relating more to the threat 
of CT rather than CT itself: these included ‘normalised cost contracts’ and ‘efficiency 
agreements’. 
 
Sine the late 1990s negotiated performance-based contracts, described as ‘quality 
contracts’ have been introduced in some centres.  The Hordaland model is the best 
example of recognising the virtues of incumbent operators (see Calquist 2001).  From 
January 2001, the contracts are long term net output-based subsidy contracts in which 
an operator is given revenue responsibility for a specific service and must focus on user 
need and demand for public transport services.  Within the contract specification, an 
operator may change fare levels and offer more flexible fares.  The service level can be 
changed if it is within a given average of service level defined in advance and specified 
in the contract.  This enables an operator to rationalize services and improve resource 
allocation over time (Berge et. al. 2005).  The operator bears all economic risks 
connected to costs and revenues.  Any cost savings realised by providing existing 
services will be used to develop new or improve existing public transport services.  The 
approach is designed to give the authorities a policy instrument to improve supply 
according to passengers changing preferences over time within the region without 
regulating the services in detail.  This is left to the agent that a priori has the best 
market knowledge. 
 
As in Great Britain, some of the more recent data for CT services in Norway indicate 
significant cost increases (in real terms) in the second and subsequent tendering rounds 
(Table 2).  It is unclear how these trends compare with the cost trends in the Norwegian 
local bus sector as a whole. 
 
In Sweden, CT for local bus services started in 1989 and by 2000 some 95% of services 
nationally had been subject to CT at least once: the market that was previously 
dominated by public operators is now dominated by private operators.  Contracts have 
typically involved a gross cost funding model, on either a route or area basis.  There are 
some doubts on the levels of cost savings achieved, and the contribution of CT to these 
savings.  National data for the period 1987-93 indicated unit cost reductions due to CT 
of around 12%-14%, but since re-estimated at 5%-6%.  Figures for Stockholm indicate 
greater unit cost reductions, in the range 20%-32% in the first 3 years after the 
implementation of CT.  More recent data indicate little further change in unit costs 
since the mid-1990s. 
 
In Finland, CT for local bus services started in 1995 and now covers most local and 
regional services.  The industry has remained a mix of public (state or municipal) and 
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private operators.  In Helsinki, unit cost reductions in the initial tender rounds were in 
the range 17% to 34%, and by 1999 overall costs were estimated at 31% lower than if 
the pre-CT rates had applied.   The second and third rounds of tendering (1997-2001 
period) have seen unit cost increases in the range 10% to 18%, but cost rates are still 
well below those prior to the introduction of CT.  
 
In Denmark, 1990 legislation imposed a CT requirement on all local bus services, and 
this was implemented progressively in the period up to 2002.  Market dominance by 
public operators was replaced by predominantly private operators.  In Copenhagen, unit 
costs reduced by some 24% (real terms) over the period 1990-1997.  Since then there 
has been an increase of around 14%, leaving a net cost reduction over the whole period 
of 13%. 
 
Other European Countries 
Table 1 also shows results of competitive tendering for some services in the 
Netherlands (3 localities) and in Italy (Rome): in both countries, the CT services 
currently account for only a small proportion of all services.  Unit cost reductions are 
indicated in the range 15% to 37% (Netherlands) and 8% to 25% (Italy, new services, 
relative to unit costs of municipal operation).  
 
United States 
The United States has a chequered history in the development of competitive tendering 
for local bus services.  Cost data are available for CT services in eight major 
metropolitan/city areas, together accounting for some 3000 buses contracted through 
CT (but only some 9% of all urban bus services).   CT has been applied to a mix of 
public and private monopoly operations, usually with management contracts.  Savings 
in unit costs per bus hour (relative to unit costs for non-competitive operations in the 
area) have been in the range 30% to 46% (Cox).  
 
Australasia 
In Australia, CT has occurred since 1993 in three cities (Adelaide, Perth, Melbourne) 
where state governments decided to open to competition services previously supplied 
by the state operator on a monopoly basis.  By contrast, area monopoly services 
provided by private operators (eg. in parts of Sydney and Melbourne) have not been 
opened to competition, but amended contracts have been negotiated with the incumbent 
(private) operators. 
 
In Adelaide and Perth, bus fleets and depots have been retained by the governments and 
leased to the successful private operators under ‘management contracts’, with area 
contracts funded on a ‘gross cost plus patronage incentive’ model.  In Melbourne, the 
government bus fleet and depots were sold to the successful private operators, with area 
contracts on an ‘augmented farebox’ basis. 
 
In all thee cities, CT has been very successful in reducing the costs of service provision.  
Unit cost reductions for Adelaide are estimated at about 38% in real terms (1994-2001), 
and for Perth at 22% (1996-2001): the lower savings figure for Perth in part reflect the 
greater cost efficiency of the previous public operator there.  The CT/contracting 
reforms have also been successful in all three cases in increasing patronage in absolute 
terms and relative to a likely counter-factual case (as far as can be assessed): 
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contributors to the increased patronage include additional services, principally at off-
peak periods (funded through the CT cost savings); adjustments of services to better 
match market needs; improvements of service quality, accompanied by enhanced 
monitoring; and the existence of the patronage incentive payments.  
 
In New Zealand, CT was introduced in a ‘big bang’ in 1991, as a component of a 
package of regulatory and institutional reforms focused on a ‘semi-deregulated’ model, 
and involving corporatisation or privatisation of the public (municipal) operators that 
had previously provided most services.  Since these reforms, private operators have 
dominated the market: a minority of bus services are being provided on a commercial 
(‘market initiative’) basis, the majority on a CT (‘authority initiative’) basis. 
 
The reform package resulted in unit costs of the ex-public monopoly operators reducing 
by around 40% (1989-1992).  By contrast, the unit costs of the private operators, that 
had previously held area monopolies in some suburban areas, reduced only marginally, 
by in the order of 5%. 
 
3.4  Summary on cost savings 
The above appraisal of the evidence from developed countries world-wide shows that 
the opening to competitive tendering (as part of a wider package of regulatory and 
institutional reforms) of services previously provided by (predominantly) publicly-
owned operators under non-competitive area/regional monopoly arrangements has in 
most cases resulted in substantial cost savings in the shorter term.  The extent of 
short/medium-term reductions in (real) unit costs in the main countries for which good 
evidence is available may be summarised as: 
 
 Great Britain : 50%-55% 
 Scandinavia : considerable spread of results (5%-34%), but most in range 
20%-30% 
 USA : 30%-46% 
 Australia : 22% (Perth), 38% (Adelaide) 
 New Zealand : c. 40% (public operators), c. 5% (private operators). 
 
These cost reductions are very substantial, and overall on the high side of the 
preconceptions of the authors (a crude ‘rule of thumb’ sometimes used is for indicative 
cost savings of 30% from competitive tendering/outsourcing). 
 
As discussed earlier, numerous factors will influence the differences in results between 
the different countries and situations, and considerable care is needed in interpreting the 
results.  One factor that is a prominent influence is that of the starting (pre-CT) 
situation, and in particular the cost efficiency of the operators in this situation.  The 
New Zealand results clearly illustrate the role of ownership in this regard: the NZ 
private operators had substantially lower costs than the public operators in the previous 
monopoly situation; and hence the cost savings achieved in respect to these private 
operator services were very much lower than those for the public operator services. 
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The above savings relate to the initial round of CT, when previous non-competitive 
monopoly operations are opened to competition.  In subsequent tendering rounds, when 
the system has matured, the weight of evidence suggests significant real cost increases 
from the initial round figures.  There is no doubt from the evidence that an element of 
these apparent cost increases is in many cases the result of more demanding contract 
specifications (eg. low-floor buses).  However, we would hypothesise that other 
components are associated with: 
 
 The greater experience of bidders, resulting in: 
− more informed bidding 
− less likelihood of bid errors or mis-estimates (which sometimes result in the 
‘winner’s curse’ problem) 
 Less emphasis by incumbent bidders on retaining market share at all costs 
 Bidders taking a longer-term perspective and nominating higher profit margins 
 Lesser levels of competition for tenders (in some cases). 
 
This is an aspect on which further research and evidence remains desirable.  
 
4.  Procuring services through contracting:  
Performance based contracts delivered through 
competitive tendering or negotiation with incumbents 
 
The assessment of alternative contract regimes in delivering bus public transport 
recognises that efforts to recover costs and reduce subsidy outlays cannot (and should 
not) be at the expense of a dimunition in the public transport task. The best single 
measure of the success of a specific contracting regime is the growth in patronage11. 
This can be attributed to many factors both within and outside of the sphere of 
influence of the operator and even the regulator. What is clearly understood is that a 
contracting regime without economic incentives is unlikely to deliver the best set of 
achievable patronage benefits. In this section we attempt to synthesise what appear to 
be the major lessons and experiences gained to date in the ongoing development of 
improved ways of contracting the provision of public transport that has appeal to all 
stakeholders.   
 
The key question is: “To what extent has competitive tendering served its role well and 
is there a growing role for negotiated performance based contracts in circumstances 
where 
 
1. the financial gains from re-tendering are small;  
2. the incumbents are efficient suppliers; and  
3. a greater focus should be placed on innovation in service supply, growing 
patronage and providing some longer term incentives for operators to invest in 
quality assets?” 
 
                                                 
11 Alternative measures are patronage per dollar of subsidy outlay and net benefit per dollar of subsidy. 
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Competitive tendering and negotiated contracts can have complementary roles under a 
performance-based regime. It is quite compatible for a given contract to determine the 
community service obligation linked to a minimum service level through competitive 
tendering while determining a patronage growth incentive payment rate through a 
negotiation process12. The key requirement is that contracts have transparency and 
simplicity. This may be helpful in some cases where a legal requirement for 
competitive tendering may be satisfied by a community service obligation 
determination, leaving a level of negotiated contract or competition at the service 
delivery stage to determine payments for service/patronage improvements.  
 
Negotiated contracts should be subject to benchmarked best-practice context-specific 
costs (that arguably approximate the competitive tendering outcome), with incentive 
payments for achieving specified growth in patronage and/or service levels.13 The 
following assessment, based on Hensher and Houghton (2005, 2005a), Preston (2001, 
2005), Wallis (2005), Wallis and Bray (2003), Wallis and Gale (2001) summarises the 
main features and merits of the competitive tendered (CT) and negotiated contract (NC) 
procurement approaches against a set of key contracting attributes. It embellishes the 
empirical evidence in the previous section and more, in recognition of the broader set of 
experiences that have evolved out of the range of contract regimes. The commentary is 
also influenced by a broader set of observed circumstances, often not reported in 
publicly available reports. 
 
4.1 Cost and subsidy impacts 
1. CT has been successful in delivering cost reductions but generally this relates to 
the first round of tendering of a public monopoly service14. 
2. Evidence is accumulating of cases where some of the initial cost savings 
through CT are eroded through cost escalation in subsequent tendering rounds.  
Such cost escalation may reflect a variety of factors such as labour market 
trends, enhanced vehicle and service specifications, reduced competition, and 
reaction to excessively low initial bids - the ‘winners curse’. 
3. It is too early to establish whether negotiated performance based contracts are 
likely to result in lower (or higher) subsidies than CT contracts. Any assessment 
must account for expected changes in service levels. 
                                                 
12 The Adelaide model enables the winner bidder to negotiate service design after winning the right to provide the services. 
13 Some operators prefer to have a government determined sum of money available that is not dependent on the success or 
otherwise of all operators in growing patronage. This is the preferred model promoted by the private operators in Sydney. This 
model essentially recognises that the competition is between public transport and other modes, especially the car. The 
challenge is for government to establish a suitable budget to ensure delivery of patronage payments. The Adelaide experience 
has shown what can happen if the operator is too successful – the money runs out but the government has a contractual 
obligation and hence is looking for ways of reducing total payments to operators. Future contracts should learn from this open-
ended approach. 
14 There is evidence that corporatisation together with budget constraints and the threat of competition may also deliver 
substantial savings – although these would tend to happen more slowly and perhaps to a lesser degree than with contracting. 
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4.2  Administration and regulatory costs 
1. CT involves significant administration costs to both operators and 
government/regulators, typically 5 percentage points of the initial cost savings. 
In addition, the transition costs to operators and to users (through service 
changes, uncertainties etc) may be considerable. Repeated tendering reduces 
administration costs but these increase as a percentage of any gains in cost 
reduction. 
2. However, NC may also involve significant transactional and coordination costs, 
particularly in establishing appropriate benchmarks and monitoring performance 
against these. Ongoing administration costs appear to be similar to CT provided 
monitoring is included in both regimes. 
3. CT may degenerate into an auction in the labour market, possibly leading to 
excessive wage reductions and the need for minimum wage level regulation, 
especially in developing economies. This appears to be the case in South Africa 
and many locations in South America. 
 
4.3  Establishment of appropriate benchmarks 
1. CT establishes benchmark subsidy rates through the competitive process as long 
as there are enough bidders. 
2. Under NC, ‘benchmarking’ and ‘yardstick competition’ approaches are used to 
approximate the results of the CT process.  However such approaches are 
imperfect (particularly in ‘green field’ situations) and may involve complex 
calibrations and extensive negotiation processes.  As each bus network and area 
is different, fair treatment across all operators may be difficult to achieve. 
3. If comparisons among firms (ie. yardstick competition), becomes systematic 
and operators under NC do not change, collusion around performance 
benchmarks may arise. However there is also a risk (with empirical evidence 
available) under CT in operators colluding in deciding who bids for which 
contracts. 
4. CT is an appealing (albeit necessary) ‘fall-back’ option for government in the 
event that the negotiation process cannot be concluded satisfactorily. 
 
4.4  Accountability and transparency 
1. NC involves a less transparent process with greater danger of regulator capture. 
2. However, CT is not free from such dangers, as illustrated by the experiences 
with the Melbourne train and tram franchises (Stanley and Hensher 2005). 
3. Under CT, the incumbent operator accumulates extensive market knowledge, 
much of which is not made available to the regulator.  This may give the 
incumbent operator a substantial advantage in re-tendering. This knowledge 
bank can be provided to the regulator under CT and NC through reporting 
requirements and auditing. 
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4.5  Optimising networks and funding allocation 
1. Networks subject to CT may be designed to maximise social surplus subject to a 
budget constraint, provided the entire network is tendered at the same time; 
otherwise social surplus maximisation is problematic. 
2. Within a NC process (and possibly CT), it is possible to arrange competition 
between operators for a fixed incentive payments budget (for patronage and/or 
service incentives), over all levels of demand and service or above a pre-
determined minimum level (as per the Hensher-Houghton (2004) framework). 
This should ensure that competitive forces are at work throughout the life of a 
PBC, provided that the incentive scheme is an effective mechanism to deliver 
service improvements and active monitoring takes place. 
3. Experience under either CT or NC, suggests that regulators typically err on the 
side of caution and tend to let contracts based on previous services.  However, 
with appropriate service review procedures during the contract term, subsequent 
changes may be initiated between the two parties – although arguably this is 
more difficult under the CT than the NC model. 
 
4.6  Some Development, performance incentives and monitoring 
1. Key performance indicators and appropriate benchmarks are an important 
feature of negotiated contracts, since they form the basis for negotiation of 
contract renewal. The regulator must have a good knowledge of best practices, 
and cannot be dependent on advice from operators (note the situation in Brazil 
where fare adjustments have been based on cost escalation advice from the 
operators – Hensher and Houghton 2005a). 
2. Under both NC and CT, incentives may need to be large to influence operator 
behaviour.  This may be a particular problem when available funds are 
constrained and have to be shared between multiple operators. 
3. Inadequate contract design (under either CT or NC) can result in perverse 
incentives, depending on the basis of reward, for example through encouraging 
empty buses, split routes, longer trips. 
4. There is a danger of setting targets too low, especially in cases where external 
factors prove favourable, and hence operators becoming complacent. 
5. Under NC, there is a danger that management effort will unduly focus on 
justifying their performance in order to secure contract renewal, rather than on 
genuine performance improvement. Government can minimise this risk by 
setting minimum targets for growth. 
 
4.7  Government funding risks 
1. All incentive-based contracts may involve significant budget uncertainty for 
government, associated with service-related or patronage-related incentive 
payments.  However, the extent (if any) of this problem depends on the details 
of contract specifications. For example, under the Adelaide bus contracts, 
incremental patronage payments approximate to incremental fares income, 
leaving minimal patronage risk to government, while government has the veto 
on any proposed service changes. 
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2. The Hensher-Houghton (2004) payment model (which could be applied under 
CT or NC) can operate within a budget cap, being designed to encourage 
competition between operators for available subsidy so as to maximise social 
surplus per $ subsidy.  
 
4.8  Encouragement of a strong, diverse supplier market 
1. CT is likely to lead to periodic new entrants to the local market, and hence 
encourage innovative approaches etc; while NC may tend to result in 
ossification of the supplier market. 
2. With suitable contract design, CT may be used to encourage the development of 
smaller and new operators, as well as provide roles for larger established and 
entrepreneurial operators (maybe from overseas).  
3. Under CT, there is some danger of excessive consolidation of the supplier 
market among a few large operators with risks of excessive market power and 
possible collusion.  However, this danger can be minimised by imposing market 
share or equivalent limits on any one operator in an area. 
4. CT may give excessive advantages to incumbents in the tendering process (eg. 
through superior information, ownership of valuable depot sites etc), thus 
discouraging a strong supplier market.  Such advantages can be reduced through 
appropriate contract specification. 
5. CT may be iniquitous under an empowerment regime such as in South Africa.  
Here it is desired to attract new entrants, to develop a market of reliable 
operators, while limiting the number through tendering (which will almost 
certainly discourage the smaller less advantaged operator), and at the same time 
giving them a limited and uncertain future in a volatile market.  The transaction 
costs will be too high for too many operators. NCs may be even more iniquitous 
if they reinforce incumbency advantages; however benchmarking of costs is 
designed to prevent this.  
 
5.  Conclusion:  Some warnings 
Transaction cost economics maintains that it is impossible to concentrate all of the 
relevant bargaining action at the ex ante contracting stage, which is what many forms of 
competitive tendering without ongoing built in incentive structures essentially do 
(Williamson 1987). Instead bargaining is pervasive in which case the institutions of 
private ordering and the study of contracting in its entirety take on critical economic 
significance. Performance-based contracts, negotiated or tendered, align with this view 
(see Hensher and Stanley 2003) since the market operates actively throughout the 
contract period (under signals delivered through incentive payments). The behavioural 
attributes of human agents, whereby conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism 
are joined, and the complex attributes of transaction with special reference to the 
condition of asset specificity, are responsible for this condition (Williamson 1987, 178). 
Alignment of incentives is central to efficient contracts and property rights. The latter 
emphasises that ownership also matters, with rights of ownership of an asset defined as 
the rights to use the asset, the right to appropriate returns from the asset, and the right to 
change the form and/or substance of an asset. Competitive tendering with incentives but 
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high (albeit inefficient) risk of continuity is problematic, giving new appeal to 
negotiated performance-based contracts. 
 
Transaction cost economics acknowledges merit in both monopoly and efficient risk-
bearing approaches. It insists, however, that efficiency purposes are sometimes served 
by restraints on trade (Williamson 1987, 188). This statement by a leading author of 
transactional economics, X-efficiency and contracting theory, is crucial to the 
discussion because it puts forth the argument that examination of the underlying 
attributes of transactions discloses that restraints on trade can help to safeguard the 
integrity of transactions when firm-specific investments are at hazard.  
 
Although competitive tendering is market driven at the time of bidding, given the 
dominating focus on cost efficiency, it generally provides the wrong set of incentives to 
do more in line with social obligations or external benefits. The market will not identify 
(or guarantee) the optimal level of subsidy as derived from a social surplus 
maximisation model in which profit maximisation and external benefits are both taken 
into account. This is especially problematic at a system-wide level, where the need to 
establish an incentive payment scheme taking into account all services in a 
geographical jurisdiction (eg a metropolitan area) is crucial to the calculation.  
 
Competitive tendering is focussed on individual contracts with no mechanism to ensure 
that the incentive payment support sums to the optimal subsidy commitment across a 
broader geographic area. This is the area where broad-based performance based 
contracts (as set out in  Larson 2001 and Hensher and Houghton 2004) has appeal 
because it takes advantage of the market, the obligation on delivering value for money 
spent from taxpayers in the form of optimal subsidy and external benefits.  If bidders 
under competitive tendering are offering prices that comply with profit maximisation, 
then this is taken into account under performance based quality contracts but within a 
framework in which profit maximisation must comply with conditions of social surplus 
maximization.  
 
To these points we add the concern that competitive tendering is open to regulatory 
capture by powerful monopolist providers. This concern increases as the number of 
operators diminishes with global purchasing.  Provided remuneration of operators under 
performance based quality contracts is based on efficient cost benchmarks, government 
objectives might be better delivered in this contracting environment (under a 
transparent partnership) than under competitive tendering.  
 
There might be some concern that rejecting competitive tendering in favour of 
negotiated performance based quality contracts will entrench existing franchised 
service areas, when perhaps some re-arrangement of these areas would better achieve 
social goals from service provision. Performance based quality contracts depend on 
partnership relationships, both between individual operators and the regulator and 
between the set of operators and the regulator.  One condition for the regulator agreeing 
to a system of performance based quality contracts across a region or area, where these 
performance based quality contracts are not delivered by competitive tendering, should 
be acceptance by the industry of operators in the region/area that, if strategic planning 
processes suggest a restructuring of service franchise areas, the industry will negotiate 
the change amongst participating operators.  Provided the industry is closely involved 
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in the strategic planning processes, this condition of performance based quality 
contracts is a reasonable price for certainty15.   
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